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EXCLUSIONARY ECONOMIC ZONING: HOW THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CIRCUMVENTED
PROHIBITIONS ON RACIAL ZONING THROUGH THE
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT
Michael Kim

INTRODUCTION
On May 25, 2020, George Floyd—a forty-six-year-old black man—was killed at
the hands of the police in Minneapolis, Minnesota.1 While Floyd was lying face
down exclaiming that he could not breathe, an officer knelt on Floyd’s neck for eight
minutes and forty-six seconds. During the final minutes, Floyd was motionless.
Floyd’s killing caused the United States to erupt in protest and triggered a renewed
discussion about systemic racism in the country. Systemic racism refers to the way
in which racism is embedded in our everyday life, manifesting itself within our
societal institutions. Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton2 defined the phrase as
follows:
When a black family moves into a home in a white neighborhood
and is stoned, burned or routed out, they are victims of an overt act of
individual racism which many people will condemn . . . . But it is
institutional racism that keeps black people locked in dilapidated slum
tenements, subject to the daily prey of exploitative slumlords,
merchants, loan sharks and discriminatory real estate agents. The
society either pretends it does not know of this latter situation, or is in
fact incapable of doing anything meaningful about it.3
The central contention of the theory of systemic racism is that the racist
institutions of our past have prominent and long-lasting effects that are reflected in
the equitable outcomes of racial groups today.

1. See Evan Hill, et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
2. Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton were both influential activists and leaders that contributed to
the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Ture was one of the original Freedom Riders and later became
a strong proponent of the global Pan-Africanism movement. Hamilton is the W. S. Sayre Professor Emeritus
of Government and Political Science at Columbia University.
3. KWAME TURE & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA
4 (1967). The concept of institutional or systemic racism is a politically controversial topic, with some
commentators even expressing the view that it does not exist at all.
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An area of life in which disparate racial outcomes are highly evident is housing.
The type of community in which a family resides has a profound influence on the
health, safety, and education of the following generation. Accordingly, racist
housing policies can be used to suppress minority communities in a cycle of violence
and poverty for generations to come. Many—perhaps even most—people in the
United States believe that the residential segregation seen in every major
metropolitan area of the United States is a phenomenon that occurred de facto, or in
other words, not officially sanctioned by law. However, this cannot be further from
the truth. The fact of the matter is that residential segregation has occurred de jure,
backed by countless government policy mandates aimed at separating people of color
from white people. Examples of racist housing policy were abundant throughout the
Jim Crow era of United States history. For instance, “redlining,” a term coined from
the color-coded credit risk maps used by lenders, refers to the practice of denying
credit to certain geographic areas because of race.4 Although the practice was made
unlawful by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, this lack of traditional sources of financing
for black families contributed to the segregation of communities which persists to
this day.5
Other segregationist efforts included affirmative government actions such as the
implementation of zoning regulations. Many zoning ordinances promulgated during
the Jim Crow era either were explicitly or implicitly intended to prevent integration
and remove minority families from white communities. In 1908, the Los Angeles
City Council passed the first municipal zoning ordinance in the United States,
establishing residential and industrial districts.6 Shortly after, in 1910, Baltimore was
the first city to adopt an explicit racial zoning ordinance, prohibiting blacks from
buying houses on majority white-owned blocks, and vice versa.7 In the following
years, many Southern and border cities followed Baltimore’s lead and administered
zoning ordinances that were based explicitly upon race.8
In 1917, the United States Supreme Court overturned a racial zoning ordinance
in Louisville, Kentucky. In Buchanan v. Warley, the Court held that zoning
ordinances based on race were an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment right to contract, as they interfered with the right of a property owner to
sell to whomever he pleases.9 This decision led to various local government entities

4. Benjamin Howell, Note, Exploiting Race and Space: Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing
Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV. 101, 107 (2006).
5. See Tracy Jan, Redlining was banned 50 years ago. It’s still hurting minorities today. WASH. POST.
(Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/28/redlining-was-banned-50years-ago-its-still-hurting-minorities-today/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
6. Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, IN URBAN PLANNING AND THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS 23 (June Manning Thomas & Marsha Ritzdorf, eds., 1997).
7. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT
SEGREGATED AMERICA 44 (2017).
8. Id. at 45.
9. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (“We think that this attempt to prevent the alienation
of the property in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State,
and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of law. That being the case the
ordinance cannot stand.”).
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trying to find various legal “loopholes” in order to essentially attain the effects of
racial zoning without explicitly referring to race.10 Enamored with the idea that
economic zoning measures that did not explicitly refer to race would remain
sustainable under Buchanan, the federal government became involved as well. In
1921, then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover organized an Advisory
Committee on Zoning with the purpose of developing a manual explaining why every
municipality should adopt their own zoning ordinance.11 That manual, which
eventually came to be known as a Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (“SZEA”),
was mass distributed to local municipalities nationwide.
This Note will argue that the SZEA was a concerted effort by federal government
officials to effectively achieve racial segregation by circumventing Buchanan’s
prohibition on explicit racial zoning ordinances through economic zoning measures.
Further, the Note will argue that the government’s goal was effectively realized with
the seminal decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., a decision marred
with fundamentally racist underpinnings. Lastly, this Note will argue that America
needs a new civil rights campaign to combat the lingering effects of governmentsponsored segregation. Part I will provide an overview of the early history of racial
zoning ordinances in the United States leading to Buchanan. Part II will be centered
around the aftermath of Buchanan and how segregationist government officials used
the SZEA as a strategy to promote economic zoning measures to local municipalities.
Part III will examine the long-term impacts of such economic zoning regulations and
explore remedies to desegregate affected neighborhoods that remain racially
segregated to the present day.

I. THE LEAD UP TO BUCHANAN
In 1886, the Supreme Court handed down a seemingly groundbreaking opinion
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.12 The facts of the case were simple. The City of San
Francisco enacted an ordinance that outlawed owners of laundries located in
buildings not made of brick or stone from operating without first obtaining a permit.13
The ordinance, however, was selectively enforced against people of Chinese
descent.14 All permit applications from persons of Chinese origin were denied, while
every application from persons of Caucasian origin, with a single exception, was
granted.15 The plaintiff, Yick Wo, was a laundry operator of Chinese descent whose
application for a permit was rejected.16 He was subsequently imprisoned and filed a

10. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 46–48.
11. Id. at 51.
12. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
13. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368.
14. Id. at 374.
15. Id. (“No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why they should not be
permitted to carry on . . . their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood. And
while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from them and from two hundred others who have also
petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to
carry on the same business under similar conditions. The fact of this discrimination is admitted.”).
16. Id.
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petition for a writ of error which eventually reached the United States Supreme
Court.17 The Supreme Court held that a law, otherwise neutral on its face, that was
administered in a discriminatory fashion was a denial of the equal protection of the
laws and thus a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.18
Although Yick Wo was a monumental decision, it unfortunately served only as a
modest precursor to post-Jim Crow Supreme Court jurisprudence. The case had little
application in the decades immediately following the decision, with prominent
commentators even expressing the opinion that there are “no reported federal or state
cases since 1886 that ha[ve] dismissed a criminal prosecution on the ground that the
prosecutor acted for racial reasons.”19 In fact, the effort by government officials to
control where people lived and worked on the basis of race was only beginning; it
was only ten years later when the Supreme Court held in Plessy v. Ferguson20 that
racially segregated facilities, as long as the qualities were equal, did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court’s “separate but equal” holding in Plessy was met by a
revitalization of Jim Crow laws across the country. Simultaneously, the turn of the
twentieth century was met with the rise of a segregationist Progressive agenda.
Woodrow Wilson became President of Princeton University, where he rejected all
black applicants, and went on to become the President of the United States, where he
re-segregated the federal government.21 In particular, “Progressives introduced the
ideas of scientific management to government . . . and applied that to land-use
planning, an idea they borrowed from Europe.”22 Additionally, “Progressives
viewed segregation as a vital aspect of social reform,”23 as it enabled them to confine
society’s underlying problems to within the borders of the “source of contagion,”
which they believed to be the black slums.24
The City of Baltimore was no different. In 1910, Baltimore enacted the first
explicitly racial zoning ordinance of the United States. The ordinance required the
following:

17. Id. at 365.
18. Id. at 374.
19. See Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1359, 1361 (2008) (quoting DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 159 (1999)); Chin, supra, at 361, n.12 (compiling
statements from renowned scholars such as Owen M. Fiss, Randall Kennedy, and James Vorenberg who all
claim that they could not find any cases after Yick Wo in which a criminal prosecution was discriminated on the
basis that the prosecutor acted with racial biases).
20. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21. Garrett Power, Eugenics, Jim Crow, and Baltimore’s Best, 49 MD. BAR J. 4, 7 (2016).
22. Michael H. Wilson, The Racist History of Zoning Laws, FOUND. ECON. EDUC. (May 21, 2019),
https://fee.org/articles/the-racist-history-of-zoning-laws/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
23. Power, supra note 21, at 10.
24. See Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: the Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910–1913,
42 MD. L. REV. 289, 301 (1983) (elaborating on why the Progressive Movement viewed racial segregation as
an integral part of their mission and explaining that the theory of Social Darwinism motivated white reformers
to establish a premise of black inferiority and subsequently blame African Americans for the social problems
that plagued their communities, aptly referring to this practice as “victim blaming”).

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

128

3/28/2022 6:09 PM

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 48:1]

1. That no negro may take up his residence in a block within the
city limits of Baltimore wherein more than half the residents are white.
2. That no white person may take up his residence in such a block
wherein more than half the residents are negroes.
3. That whenever building is commenced in a new city block the
builder or contractor must specify in his application for a permit for
which race the proposed house or houses are intended.25
The ordinance was the brainchild of Milton Dashiel, a local Baltimore attorney.
According to Dashiel, the ordinance was needed to prevent “negro[s] . . . who have
risen somewhat above their fellows . . . [from] get[ting] as close to the company of
white people as circumstances will permit them.”26 This ordinance was introduced
to the City Council by Councilman Samuel West, and after a lengthy consideration
process, was signed into law by Mayor J. Barry Mahool.27 Mayor Mahool, a
nationally recognized star of the Progressive movement, threw his unequivocal
support behind the city’s efforts to achieve racial segregation.28 Like many of his
colleagues, Mayor Mahool took the position that “Blacks should be quarantined in
isolated slums in order to reduce the incidents of civil disturbance, to prevent the
spread of communicable disease . . . and to protect property values among the White
majority.”29
Although the de jure segregation imposed by the ordinance appeared to satisfy
the “separate but equal” constitutional requirement set out in Plessy,30 enforcement
proved to be much more practically challenging than what was anticipated. In
addition to the inevitable black opposition, property owners in mixed districts with a
black minority expressed concerns that they would no longer be able to rent out their
properties to black tenants.31 There were instances where white homeowners would
move out while their house was being repaired and could not move back in because
the block was now majority black.32 Further, it was unclear whether a black person
would be allowed to move into a block that was evenly divided between white and
black.33 Legal challenges to the ordinance were swiftly brought and the ordinance
was subsequently declared ineffective and void by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
for being “inaccurately drawn.”34

25. Baltimore Tries Drastic Plan of Race Segregation; Strange Situation Which Led the Oriole City to
Adopt the Most Pronounced “Jim Crow” Measure on Record, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1910),
https://www.nytimes.com/1910/12/25/archives/baltimore-tries-drastic-plan-of-race-segregation-strangesituation.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2020).
26. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 44.
27. Power, supra note 24, at 299–300.
28. SILVER, supra note 6, at 3.
29. Id. at 3–4.
30. Power, supra note 23.
31. Power, supra note 23, at 302.
32. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 44.
33. Id.
34. Power, supra note 23, at 303. Surprisingly (or perhaps not surprisingly at all), “inaccurately drawn”
did not refer to the practical difficulties the ordinance created. Although there is no published opinion, the
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Rather than being discouraged by the Supreme Bench’s holding, supporters of
the segregation ordinance were “undaunted,” invigorated even, in their quest to
achieve racial segregation.35 Councilman West turned to William Marbury, one of
the nation’s leading lawyers and a devoted eugenicist who spent “his professional life
in active opposition to the integration of African-Americans into full citizenship and
participation in Baltimore life.”36 In order to address the complaints made by
property owners, Marbury revised the ordinance to exclude “mixed” blocks from the
segregation requirement.37 The amended version was then signed into law in 1911,
leaving the City’s integrated districts unaffected.38
Other municipalities took note of Baltimore’s pioneering ordinance and followed
suit, modifying Baltimore’s template and enacting their own racial zoning laws.
Notable cities include Richmond and Norfolk, Virginia; Atlanta, Georgia;
Charleston, South Carolina; Asheville and Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Dallas,
Texas; Birmingham, Alabama; Dade County, Florida; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma;
New Orleans, Louisiana; St. Louis, Missouri; and Louisville, Kentucky.39 Racial
zoning, however, was not limited to Southern and border cities. Met with waves of
African Americans relocating northward as part of the first Great Migration, select
Northern cities, such as Chicago, also experimented with the practice.40 As these
ordinances continued to proliferate throughout the country, they were met with
numerous legal challenges. Many of these ordinances, however, received approval
from the highest courts of their respective state. Richmond’s racial zoning ordinance
was sustained by the Virginia Supreme Court in 1915, and Atlanta’s ordinance was
similarly sustained by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1917.41 However, this trend
quickly faded later in the year when the United States Supreme Court outlawed a
Louisville city ordinance in the seminal case of Buchanan v. Warley.

II. BUCHANAN V. WARLEY
A. Buchanan v. Warley
Buchanan involved a Louisville ordinance titled:

defect was presumably in the ordinance’s title, which was overly nondescriptive in violation of the Baltimore
City Charter. Id.
35. Id. at 304.
36. Power, supra note 23, at 7–8.
37. Power, supra note 23, at 304.
38. Id.
39. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 45; See also SILVER, supra note 6, at 4. Both sources list various cities
which enacted racial zoning ordinances following Baltimore. Some of these cities acted with haste and enacted
explicitly racial zoning ordinances. Others, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s holding in Buchanan v. Warley,
discussed at infra note 42, implemented economic zoning measures designed to achieve the same result.
40. See SILVER, supra note 6, at 2.
41. Id. at 4, 6. See also Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 86 S.E. 139 (Va. 1915) (affirming the legality of
Richmond’s racial-zoning ordinance); see also Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401 (Ga. 1917) (affirming the
legality of Atlanta’s racial-zoning ordinance).
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An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white
and colored races in the City of Louisville, and to preserve the public
peace and promote the general welfare by making reasonable
provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use of separate blocks for
residences, places of abode and places of assembly by white and
colored people respectively.42
The first and second sections of the ordinance explicitly “prevent[ed] the
occupancy of a lot in the City of Louisville by a person of color in a block where the
greater number of residences are occupied by white persons; where such a majority
exists colored persons [were] excluded.”43 Plaintiff was a white real estate agent,
Buchanan, who contracted to sell property on a majority white block to a black
NAACP lawyer, Warley.44 The purchase offer was stated as follows:
It is understood that I am purchasing the above property for the
purpose of having erected thereon a house which I propose to make my
residence, and it is a distinct part of this agreement that I shall not be
required to accept a deed to the above property or to pay for said
property unless I have the right under the laws of the State of Kentucky
and the City of Louisville to occupy said property as a residence.45
When Warley refused to complete the transaction on the grounds that the
ordinance forbade him from doing so, Buchanan petitioned the trial court for specific
performance.46 The lower courts denied Buchanan’s request based solely on the
effect of the ordinance in question.47 The United States Supreme Court noted that
“[b]ut for the ordinance the state courts would have enforced the contract.”48
Considering that “[t]his interdiction is based wholly upon color; simply that and
nothing more,” the Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as an unconstitutional
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.49 The
Court first observed that the ordinance was sought to be “justified under the authority
of the State to exercise its police power” in the promotion of public health, safety,
and welfare by preventing race conflicts.50 Although the Court acknowledged that
the states’ police power has been interpreted to be very broad, it held that an exercise
of that police power cannot “run[] counter to the limitations of the Federal
Constitution.”51 The Court went on to account for the fact that “the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 70 (1917).
Id. at 73.
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 69–70. (emphasis added)
Id. at 70.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. at 73, 82.
Id. at 73–74.
Id. at 74.
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rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the
protection of the general government . . . whenever [enjoyment is] denied by the
states.”52 Therefore, the Court held that the ordinance in question deprived people
of color of the fundamental rights in property (to buy and sell private property from/to
whomever they please) that were enjoyed by white people.53
The Court distinguished this case from Plessy on the grounds that the zoning
ordinance in question was separate, but not equal, as per the standard required in
order to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment.54 The Court first considered that
in Plessy, there was no attempt to deprive the plaintiff of color of his right to ride the
method of transportation at issue.55 In fact “[i]n each instance, the complaining
person was afforded the opportunity . . . [or] the thing of whatever nature to which
in the particular case he was entitled,” and the separate “classification of
accommodations was permitted upon the basis of equality for both races.”56 This
was not the case in regard to the Louisville city ordinance, the Court contended, as
the law explicitly deprived persons of color of their fundamental rights to property.57
Distinguished commentator Richard Rothstein has criticized the Court’s
reasoning behind the Buchanan decision, observing that the “majority was enamored
of the idea that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to protect
the rights of freed slaves but a business rule: ‘freedom of contract.’”58 Professor
Garrett Power makes the case that Buchanan was actually a controversy that was
manufactured by the NAACP.59 He notes that in the 1905 case of Lochner v. New
York, the Supreme Court had held that a New York statute which limited the hours
bakers were permitted to work to ten a day violated the employer’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to contract.60 The litigation strategy behind Buchanan, he argues,
was to convince the Court to once again embrace this “economic laissez-faire” credo
and “protect Buchanan’s constitutional right to engage in the real estate business
without meddlesome interference from the City of Louisville (and thereby
incidentally . . . protect blacks from residential housing segregation).”61 Regardless
of the Court’s reasoning supporting the opinion, Buchanan remains a pathbreaking
decision that held unlawful zoning ordinances that explicitly segregate people based
on race.
52. Id. at 77.
53. Id. at 82.
54. Id. at 81.
55. Id. at 79. Plessy v. Ferguson dealt with a Louisiana law that mandated separate railway cars for white
and African American persons. The Court in that case goes to great lengths to avoid application of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The Court reasons that the Amendment
could not have possibly “been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either,”
and that “[l]aws . . . requiring . . . their separation . . . in places where they are liable to be brought into
contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
544 (1896).
56. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 79–80 (1917).
57. Id. at 82.
58. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 45.
59. See Power, supra note 23, at 312.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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B. Circumventing the Buchanan Holding: the SZEA and Euclid
In the aftermath of Buchanan, state and local governments hurriedly prepared
subtler measures attempting to achieve racial segregation without violating the law
of the 1917 Supreme Court decision.62 Unlike many of the pre-Buchanan ordinances,
these new efforts engaged professional planners and created comprehensive zoning
schemes which would indirectly create a legal form of residential segregation.63
Although the Buchanan decision undermined the use of zoning ordinances to
explicitly segregate residential spaces according to race, it did nothing to prohibit
“the use of the planning process in the service of apartheid.”64 Therefore,
segregationists attempted to “fashion a legally defensible racial zoning system in
tandem with comprehensive city planning.”65
This post-Buchanan attack on integrated housing generally took the form of a
class-based economic zoning system. Frequently, such ordinances were designed to
“maintain the character of a neighborhood”66—a phrase that was clearly motivated
by a desire to maintain the neighborhood’s racial demographics. Land use
regulations were used to establish a minimum price for housing that would effectively
exclude low and middle-class households from certain neighborhoods.67 One of the
first municipalities to “link racial exclusion to neighborhood preservation” was
Charleston, South Carolina.68 At the request of the Society for the Preservation of
Old Dwellings, the City of Charleston hired a planner named Morris Knowles to
prepare a zoning ordinance “sensitive to the unique heritage of Charleston.”69 In the
name of protecting the designated historic district, Knowles drafted a plan that
included segregated residential districts for black and white people.70 Although the
explicit racial labels were omitted from the final version of the plan, local testimony
demonstrates that removal of black residents from the historic area was an implicitly
desired goal of the zoning ordinance.71
Given the increased utilization of comprehensive economic planning schemes by
the states to achieve the objective of racial segregation, the United States federal
government eventually became enthusiastically involved in the process as well. In
1921, the Warren G. Harding Administration directed then-Secretary of Commerce

62. See SILVER, supra note 6, at 7.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 8.
66. Frank Aloi & Arthur Abba Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning of
the End?, URB. L. ANN. 9, 11 (1971). The authors note that typical devices used to achieve this objective
include minimum lot size requirements, minimum building size requirements, frontage requirements, exclusion
of mobile homes, bedroom restrictions, land improvement requirements, minimum floor space requirements,
living density requirements, prohibition of multiple-family dwellings, and various provisions in building codes.
Id.
67. Id. at 14.
68. SILVER, supra note 6, at 9–10.
69. Id. at 9.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 9–10.
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Herbert Hoover to organize an Advisory Committee on Zoning.72 The purpose of
that committee was to develop a manual in order to convince all local municipalities
to adopt zoning ordinances.73 The end product enacted in 1922 was the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act (“SZEA”): a model zoning law that was distributed to
thousands of local governments nationwide.74 In order to circumvent the Buchanan
holding, the SZEA did not make explicit reference to the creation of racially
segregated residential neighborhoods as a reason for the federal government’s
advocacy for zoning.75 However, the lifelong works of the outspoken segregationists
who comprised the Advisory Committee indicated that racial segregation was indeed
a priority.76
The most influential Advisory Committee member was Frederick Law Olmsted,
Jr., a former president of the American Society of Landscape Architects and the
American City Planning Institute.77 Although Olmsted has left a brilliant legacy as
the “father of American landscape architecture” as well as the mastermind behind the
design of New York City’s Central Park, he also directed the federal government to
build more than 100,000 units of segregated housing for defense plant workers during
World War I.78 He was a devoted segregationist who believed that “‘in any housing
developments which are to succeed, . . . racial divisions . . . have to be taken into
account. . . . [If] you try to force the mingling of people who are not yet ready to
mingle, and don’t want to mingle,’ a development cannot succeed economically.”79
Other members included Morris Knowles, the author of Charleston, South
Carolina’s racial historic preservation zoning scheme and Lawrence Veiller, a
progressive tenement reformer and prominent eugenicist.80 Alfred Bettman, the
Director of the National Conference on City Planning, was also a member of the

72. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 51.
73. See id.
74. See id. See also DEP’T OF COM., ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT: UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (1926), Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office [hereinafter “Revised SZEA Text”]. The SZEA consisted of nine total
sections. Most notably, the first section included a grant of power, the second section included a provision that
the local legislature can divide its territory into districts, and the third section included a statement of purpose
for the enacted zoning regulations.
75. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 51.
76. Id. See also Revised SZEA Text, supra note 74. The Advisory Committee appointed by Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover was comprised of Charles B. Ball, the Secretary-Treasurer of the City Planning
Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers; Edward M. Bassett, Counsel to the Zoning Committee of
New York; Alfred Bettman, Director of the National Conference on City Planning; Irving B. Hiett, Ex-President
of the National Association of Real Estate Boards; John Ihlder, Manager of the Civic Development Department
of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; Morris Knowles, Member of the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States and Chairman of the City Planning Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers;
Nelson P. Lewis, Member of the National Conference on City Planning and Past President of the American City
Planning Institute; J. Horace McFarland, Ex-President of the American Civic Association, Frederick Law
Olmsted, Ex-President of the American Society of Landscape Architects and Ex-President of the American City
Planning Institute; and Lawrence Veiller, Secretary and Director of the National Housing Association. Id.
77. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 51.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Lawrence Veiller: Progressive Tenement Reformer and Eugenicist, HIST. NEWS NETWORK: LIBERTY
AND POWER (June 28, 2014), https://historynewsnetwork.org/blog/153403.
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Advisory Committee.81 As part of a mission to help establish planning commissions
in municipalities throughout the nation, he once explained that land use planning was
necessary to “maintain the nation and the race.”82 Advisory Committee members
such as Irving B. Hiett who also held leadership positions in the National
Associations of Real Estate Boards also reinforced the Advisory Committee’s
“segregationist consensus.”83 In 1924, the Association buttressed the SZEA with a
code of ethics which stated that “a realtor should never be instrumental in introducing
into a neighborhood . . . members of any race or nationality . . . whose presence
will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood.”84
The goals that the SZEA set out to achieve were successfully accomplished.
More than 55,000 copies of the first edition were published and sold, and by 1926,
nineteen states had enacted enabling acts based on the SZEA model.85 The Advisory
Committee had achieved its goal of legitimizing comprehensive economic zoning
measures across the United States. At the same time, a new and discreet form of
discrimination had emerged to the forefront of the municipal governments’ arsenals.
Class-based zoning schemes were more difficult to oppose than explicitly racial preBuchanan ordinances and much easier to administer without attracting the ire of the
public. Even in the present day it almost feels right to say that the government should
be able to segregate affluent areas and usages from more impoverished ones.
However, classism and racism are often “so intertwined”86 that in many cases it is
almost impossible to distinguish a municipality’s true motives as racial
discrimination. Indeed, in the case of the SZEA, courts turned a blind eye to an
unconstitutional violation of rights that has lingering effects to this day.
As Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover and his Advisory Committee used
the SZEA to promote the establishment of municipal zoning regulations across the
country, legal challenges to the practice were burgeoning in the lower courts. Those
challenges culminated in the 1926 Supreme Court case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., which validated the SZEA authors’ premise that economic zoning
ordinances that do not explicitly refer to racial segregation would be legally
sustainable.87 The case originated from a comprehensive zoning ordinance
promulgated by the Village of Euclid which divided the village into “six classes of
use districts, denominated U-1 to U-6 . . . three classes of height districts,
denominated H-1 to H-3 . . . and four classes of area districts, denominated A-1 to
A-4. . . .”88 Ambler Realty owned a sixty-eight-acre tract of land situated on the west
side of the village.89 As a result of the newly enacted ordinance, Ambler Realty was
restricted from the types of uses it could participate in on its property—most notably

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Revised SZEA Text, supra note 74.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 51–52.
Id. at 52.
Id.
See Revised SZEA Text, supra note 74.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 53.
See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 379.
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industrial uses.90 Ambler Realty sought an injunction against enforcement of the
Village’s ordinance, claiming that it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution as well as various
provisions of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.91 Specifically, Ambler Realty
argued that the use restrictions imposed by the ordinance significantly reduced the
value of its land, deterred potential buyers, and had the effect of diverting investment
and development to other areas.92
Although the Supreme Court upheld the validity of comprehensive zoning
ordinances in Euclid, Judge Westenhaver of the District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio “prophetically identified the problem[,]” saying:93
[I]t is . . . apparent that the next step in the exercise of this police
power would be to apply similar restrictions for the purpose of
segregating in like manner various groups of newly arrived immigrants.
The blighting of property values and the congesting of population,
whenever the colored or certain foreign races invade a residential
section, are so well known as to be within the judicial cognizance. . .
. The plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question is
to place all the property in an undeveloped area of 16 square miles in a
strait-jacket. The purpose to be accomplished is really to regulate the
mode of living of persons who may hereafter inhabit it. In the last
analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and
segregate them according to their income or situation in life.94
Unable to “pretend ignorance of [the ordinance’s] true racial purpose,”95 Judge
Westenhaver, relying heavily on Buchanan v. Warley, enjoined enforcement of the
ordinance and held it to be unconstitutional and void.96
In overruling the district court decision on appeal, Justice Sutherland authored a
seminal opinion, holding that zoning ordinances can only be held unconstitutional if
they are “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”97 The central thrust of the Court’s
opinion reflected the argument in defense of the practice of zoning put forward by
one Alfred Bettman, who strategically filed an amicus curiae brief to the litigation.98
90. Id. at 382. Ambler Realty’s tract of land fell within U-2, U-3, and U-6 use districts. Id. The first 620
feet of the tract excluded apartment houses, hotels, churches, schools, other public and semipublic buildings,
and other uses enumerated in U-3 to U-6 districts as permitted uses. Id. The next 130 feet excluded industries,
theaters, bank, shops, and other uses set forth in U-4 to U-6 as permitted uses. Id.
91. Id. at 384.
92. Id. at 384–85.
93. Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 66, at 10.
94. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 313, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
95. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 53.
96. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
97. Id. at 395.
98. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see also Brief on Behalf
of the National Conference on City Planning, the Ohio State Conference on City Planning, the National Housing
Association, and the Massachusetts Federation of Town Planning Boards as Amici Curiae Supporting
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Bettman posited, in a section of his brief titled “Analogies with Other Types of
Regulations of Property,” that “[z]oning is simply a modern mode or application to
modern urban conditions of recognized and sanctioned methods of regulating
property.”99 He then argued that the most apt comparison was the common law of
nuisance, and that since prevention of nuisances is a constitutional authority
possessed by local legislatures, that authority should extend to zoning as well:100
What, for example, is the relationship of zoning to the law of
nuisances? The term “nuisance” is usually applied to those
developments which are offensive in the most crude and obvious way.
. . . A slaughterhouse or foundry next door to a residence, throwing
its odors or clanging noises into that residence over an intervening
space of a few feet, is a nuisance. . . . The philosophy underlying the
above illustration is nothing more or less than the old adage that a man
shall not so use his property as to injure another; and the precept, that a
man may not send noise or odor or other disturbing substances or
vibration into or onto his neighbor’s property. . . . The zoning
ordinance, by segregating the industrial districts from the residential
districts, aims to produce. . .the segregation of the noises and odors
and turmoils necessarily incident to the operation of industry from
those sections of the city in which the homes of the people are or may
be appropriately located. The mode of regulation may be new; but the
purpose and the fundamental justification are the same.101
Bettman then went on to juxtapose the “negative” effects of apartment buildings
on the typical American family with the “positive” effects of single family homes,
invoking a moral dichotomy to justify the implementation of single family zones. He
wrote:
[T]he man who seeks to place the home for his children in an
orderly neighborhood, with some open space and light and fresh air and
quiet, is . . . motivated . . . by the assumption that his children are
likely to grow mentally, physically and morally more healthful in such
a neighborhood than in a disorderly, noisy, slovenly, blighted and slumlike district. This assumption is indubitably correct. The researches of
physicians and public health students have demonstrated the
importance of our physical environment as a factor in our physical
health, mental sanity and moral strength. . . . The comparative health
statistics of the planned and unplanned communities . . . tend to show

Appellants, at 23, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (No. 665) [hereinafter Bettman
Amicus Brief].
99. Bettman Amicus Brief; see also Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 597, 611 (2001) (citing Bettman Amicus Brief).
100. Chused, supra note 99, at 611–12.
101. Id.; Bettman Amicus Brief, supra note 99, at 23–24.
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more favorable results in the former than in the latter. Disorderliness in
the environment has as detrimental an effect upon health and character
as disorderliness within the house itself.102
Bettman warned the Court that fundamental American moral values were at
stake, and that land use regulations were the only protection.103
Bettman’s fearmongering tactics were a success. Justice Sutherland was fully
convinced by Bettman’s imagery, and wrote a majority opinion that adopted much of
Bettman’s language:
[T]he development of detached house sections is greatly retarded
by the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in
destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in such
sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed
in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
surroundings created by the residential character of the district.
Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others,
interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and
monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the
smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the
disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the
occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of larger
portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving
children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by
those in more favored localities–until, finally, the residential character
of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached
residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment
houses, which in a different environment would be not only entirely
unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to being
nuisances.104
The Euclid decision marked the success of the Advisory Committee’s efforts.
The opinion rubber-stamped comprehensive zoning schemes and allowed for
municipalities to implement exclusionary measures as long as they did not overtly
refer to race. In doing so, the Court exhibited a break from its previous jurisprudence
which rejected “regulations that restricted what an owner could do with his
property.”105 The Court also used code-words to “call[] forth the most negative,
stereotypical imagery”106 of multi-family housing units, fully embracing classism in

102. Bettman Amicus Brief, supra note 99, at 29–30.
103. Chused, supra note 99, at 613.
104. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926) (emphasis added).
105. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 52. Euclid is notable in that a highly conservative bench of Supreme
Court justices approved the legitimacy of zoning as a regulatory device despite their prominent objections to
government regulation. Id.
106. Chused, supra note 99, at 613.
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the name of American upper-class “morals.” Despite these connotations, Euclid is a
decision that is often looked at with rose-tinted glasses. It is reflected upon by
planners, developers, government officials, and professors as “constructing the
contours of contemporary land use law.”107 However, the truth of the matter is that
the decision bears an ugly, racist history and has contributed to the residential
segregation we still see in every major metropolitan area in the United States to the
present day.

III. REMEDIES TO RIGHT OUR WRONGS: DESEGREGATION AND
REPARATIONS
Residential segregation is unique in that desegregation is impossible to achieve
overnight. Even though fifty years have passed since the passage of the 1968 Fair
Housing Act,108 black-white residential segregation remains high in the United
States. According to an analysis of data distributed by the United States Census
Bureau for the years 2013–17, the dissimilarity index between blacks and whites was
0.526 for the median metropolitan area—meaning that 52.6 percent of blacks or
whites would have to move to achieve full racial integration.109 This residential
segregation, as explained in the previous sections, was not de facto—it is the result
of full-fledged government intervention. These de jure racial and economic zoning
measures are contrary to the doctrine of Buchanan and are thus unconstitutional
violations of the rights of black persons throughout the country. “[W]here there is a
legal right, there is also a legal remedy.”110 Since segregation was governmentbacked, desegregation must be as well. We need aggressive, affirmative policy
mandates aimed towards desegregating the populace and reparations for the
opportunity gap that was created over the years.111 This Part will explore those
possible remedies.

107. Id. at 597.
108. The Fair Housing Act was enacted in 1968 as a response to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King. Timothy M. Smyth, et al., The Fair Housing Act: The Evolving Regulatory Landscape for Federal Grant
Recipients and Sub-Recipients, 23 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L. 2, 231–258 (2015). As originally
written, the statute prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, and national origin, with
the goal of rectifying past and present practices of housing discrimination. See Id. at 231–258.
109. Kimberly Quick & Richard D. Kahlenberg, Attacking the Black-White Opportunity Gap That Comes
from Residential Segregation, CENTURY FOUND. (June 25, 2019) https://tcf.org/content/report/attacking-blackwhite-opportunity-gap-comes-residential-segregation/?agreed=1#easy-footnote-bottom-2. See also About
Dissimilarity Indices, CENSUSSCOPE, https://www.censusscope.org/about_dissimilarity.html (last visited Nov.
29, 2021) (“The dissimilarity index varies between 0 and 100, and measures the percentage of one group that
would have to move across neighborhoods to be distributed the same way as the second group. . . .A
dissimilarity index of 0 indicates conditions of total integration under which both groups are distributed in the
same proportions across all neighborhoods. A dissimilarity index of 100 indicates conditions of total
segregation such that the members of one group are located in completely different neighborhoods than the
second group. Neither extreme value is generally seen in most cities and metropolitan areas. Rather the value
typically lies somewhere in-between 0 and 100.”).
110. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 162 (1803).
111. See Quick & Kahlenberg, supra note 109 (“Black-white residential segregation is a major source of
unequal opportunity for African Americans: among other things, it perpetuates an enormous wealth gap and
excludes black students from many high-performing schools. . . . Because the federal, state and local policy
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A. Promoting Inclusionary Zoning: New Jersey’s Mount Laurel Doctrine and
Massachusetts’s “Anti-Snob” Zoning Law
One remedy is to prohibit exclusionary zoning ordinances and require
inclusionary zoning ordinances—as demonstrated by New Jersey’s Mount Laurel
Doctrine. This doctrine stems from the 1975 New Jersey Supreme Court case
Southern Burlington County, N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel. In that case,
the N.A.A.C.P. sued to invalidate a restrictive zoning ordinance promulgated by the
Township of Mount Laurel on the grounds that it effectively prevented low- and
moderate-income residents from living in the municipality, thus violating the
Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the New Jersey State
Constitution.112 The ordinance in question reserved 29.2% of the township for
industrial use and restricted residential development to “single-family, detached
dwellings, one house per lot.”113
In striking down the ordinance as a violation of the state Constitution, the New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that “Mount Laurel ‘has acted affirmatively to control
development and to attract a selective type of growth’ and that ‘through its zoning
ordinances has exhibited economic discrimination in that the poor have been
deprived of adequate housing. . . .’”114 The court held as follows:
[T]he presumptive obligation arises for each such municipality
affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regulations, the
reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of
housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet
the needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who may
desire to live within its boundaries. Negatively, it may not adopt
regulations or policies which thwart or preclude that opportunity.115
The court reasoned that all local zoning regulations, as they derive from the
state’s police power, must “serve the welfare of the state’s citizens beyond the
borders of the particular municipality” when they have a “substantial external
impact.”116 Like any exercise of police power, the regulation “must promote public
health, safety, morals, or the general welfare.”117 For the court, it was “plain beyond
dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all categories of people is
certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local

arenas were the laboratory for engineering black-white residential segregation, that is where people must work
to help undo it.”).
112. S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 716, 725 (1975).
113. Id. at 719.
114. Id. at 723. (The Court further noted that the Township’s objective was to take advantage of a New
Jersey tax structure and suppress local property taxes, and that “the policy was carried out without regard for
non-fiscal considerations with respect to People, either within or without its boundaries.”).
115. Id. at 728.
116. Id. at 726.
117. Id. at 725.
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land use regulation.”118 Since the need for such sufficient housing is so significant,
townships like Mount Laurel, said the court, must consider housing needs for citizens
located outside the municipalities’ borders.119
On appeal from several Mount Laurel cases in 1983, the New Jersey Supreme
Court was able to reaffirm the decision laid out in Southern Burlington County and
provide more guidance on the Mount Laurel Doctrine.120 According to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, court-mandated responses included a builder’s remedy (which
would force the municipality to allow certain construction) and inclusionary zoning
devices—such as density bonuses to encourage below-market housing set-asides.121
By providing doctrinal clarification, the court streamlined future Mount Laurel cases
and made litigation more effective.
A similar remedy to the Mount Laurel Doctrine is the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Permit Act: Chapter 40B, also known as the “Anti-Snob” Zoning
Act.122 This legislation was enacted in 1969 to help address the shortage of
affordable housing in the state and is aimed to reduce unnecessary barriers to
affordable housing development.123 The Act allows affordable housing developers
to override certain municipal zoning laws and requires “local Zoning Boards of
Appeals to approve affordable housing developments under flexible rules.”124
Specifically, in municipalities where less than ten percent of housing is legally
qualified as affordable, developers can circumvent density requirements “if at least
20–25% of the units have long-term affordability restrictions.”125 In the decade since
2010 when fifty-eight percent of voters voted for the continuation of the statute, the
law has been responsible for “58,000 homes for seniors, the disabled, and working
families” and “80% of all new affordable housing possible in Massachusetts
suburbs.”126
B. Land Banking through Tax Foreclosures
Exclusionary zoning ordinances that segregate affluent areas and uses from the
less fortunate lead to destitute neighborhoods filled with vacant properties. Vacant
properties invite natural wear and tear as well as vandalism, causing devastating
effects to the real estate value of the surrounding community, eventually resulting in

118. Id. at 727.
119. Id. at 728.
120. S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). The New Jersey Supreme
Court set up a special court system to allow expedited and simplified Mount Laurel Litigation, substantially
increase the effectiveness of the judicial remedy, and to ensure municipal compliance with the constitutional
obligation of providing affordable housing needs to the greater region. Id. at 439–440.
121. Id. at 445–48, 452–53.
122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1969).
123. Id.
124. Chapter 40 B Planning and Information, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/chapter-40-b-planningand-information (last visited Nov. 29, 2021).
125. Id.
126. Planning Office for Urban Affairs, Chapter 40B & Chapter 40R, ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON,
https://poua.org/housing-advocacy/chapter (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
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a vicious cycle of poverty for the residents.127 Repairs on such properties could easily
exceed the resulting value of the house—and even if an investor were willing to make
the repairs, he or she may be confronted with obscurities such as a fragmented title128
or an inability to secure a private mortgage.129
A powerful remedy that can revitalize a blighted neighborhood and bring racial
justice to its occupants is land banking through tax foreclosure. Since most vacant
properties are behind on their property taxes, a local government can foreclose on the
unpaid debt and acquire the title to the property. Payment of property taxes is a
“fundamental and universally applicable obligation of property ownership.”130
Because a delinquent taxpayer “does not expect to be able to escape the consequences
of delinquency, the prospect of tax foreclosure does not threaten the security of tenure
of property owners generally,” making it a highly effective method of reconstructing
a fragmented title.131 The tax foreclosure method also gives the municipality the
advantage of sidestepping the use of its eminent domain power to transfer vacant
properties to private developers—an exercise of power which has become very
controversial after the 2005 Supreme Court decision of Kelo v. New London.132
The concept of land banking is “nothing more than the acquisition of vacant
properties for subsequent return to productive use.”133 Once the tax delinquent
properties are foreclosed upon, a local government-sponsored land bank will hold
onto the titles and facilitate investment coordination with private developers.134 This
mechanism streamlines the investment process since private developers can simply
bargain with the true owner who is looking to make a sale instead of having to track
down all of the lienholders to the property.135 By implementing a land banking
through tax foreclosure scheme, local governments can strive to reverse the effects

127. James J. Kelly, Jr., A Continuum in Remedies: Reconnecting Vacant Houses to the Market, 33 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 114 (2013) (“[T]he presence of vacant houses reduces the resale value of complaint
houses within a block or two by at least 1.3% per vacant house.”).
128. Id. at 120 (“When legal ownership of a property is in limbo, even cost-effective investments and
maintenance will fall between the cracks.”).
129. Id. at 116.
130. Id. at 130.
131. Id.
132. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). This controversial case involved the City of New
London using its eminent domain power to seize private property and sell it to the Pfizer corporation, which
intended to develop the land for corporate use. The City argued that the purpose of the eminent domain exercise
was to spur economic growth by creating new jobs and increasing tax revenues. Plaintiff Kelo, a New London
resident who had her property seized, argued that the City’s purpose violated the “Public Use” requirement of
the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution. In holding for the City, the Supreme Court explained that a
local government may validly exercise its eminent domain authority to take private property and distribute it to
private developers without violating the “Public Use” requirement, so long as the overarching purpose is to
promote public welfare. The Court added that nothing precluded the states from placing further restrictions on
its eminent domain power through interpreting or amending the state Constitution. In the aftermath of Kelo,
several states voiced disagreement to the decision and quickly implemented additional restrictions on their
eminent domain power. See also ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: “KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON” AND
THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 181–92 (2016).
133. Kelly, supra note 116, at 130.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 120.
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of past exclusionary zoning ordinances and promote the process of community
restoration and the achievement of racial justice.136
C. Political Remedies: Tightening the Fair Housing Act and Other Fixes
In his book, The Color of Law, Richard Rothstein argues that America needs a
new civil rights movement to undo the damage done by a century of governmentbacked residential segregation.137 Rothstein asserts the importance of awareness and
advocacy, contending that only once the nation develops a “shared understanding of
our common history will it be practical to consider steps we could take to fulfill our
obligations.”138 Specifically, he argues that American citizens cannot “continue to
accept the myth of de facto segregation.”139 Modern American history textbooks
must portray an accurate account of government-backed segregation, instead of the
passive, inaccurate, one sentence explanation contained in most textbooks today.140
Policymakers and the public must “acknowledge that the federal, state, and local
governments segregated our metropolitan areas,” and “open [their] minds to
considering how those same federal, state, and local governments might adopt
equally aggressive policies to desegregate.”141
One policy area where public advocacy is especially important is the
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing obligation of the Fair Housing Act. Although
the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny a
dwelling to any person because of race,”142 it also charges the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (“HUD”) to “affirmatively further” its goals of ending
residential segregation—an obligation which HUD then extends to participating
jurisdictions.143 The Obama administration attempted to satisfy this obligation in
2015 by promulgating a rule which required HUD funding recipients to create a

136. Id. at 130–131.
137. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 198.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 199 (“One of the most commonly used American history textbooks is The Americans:
Reconstruction to the 21st Century. . . . The 2012 edition has this to say about residential segregation in the
North: ‘African Americans found themselves forced into segregated neighborhoods.’ That’s it. One passive
voice sentence. No suggestion of who might have done the forcing or how it was implemented.”).
141. Id. at 198.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012). In Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Community’s Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015), the Supreme Court held that Fair Housing Act claims may be
brought on a “disparate impact” theory, meaning that the actor is not necessarily required to act with
discriminatory intent to violate the statute. In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court explained that
the disparate impact theory was consistent with both the Act’s language and the congressional purpose behind
the Act—eliminating discriminatory practices. That decision began to pave the way for a new species of
litigation and may be a promising tool to use for attacking exclusionary zoning ordinances that do not explicitly
display discriminatory intent. See generally Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015).
143. James J. Kelly, Jr., Affirmatively Furthering Neighborhood Choice: Vacant Property Strategies and
Fair Housing, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012)).
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comprehensive Assessment of Fair Housing (“AFH”) for HUD review.144 The
Trump administration completed removal of the AFH rule in 2020.145
Repealing regulations on municipalities’ obligation to affirmatively further fair
housing is not the direction in which the United States should be headed. Although
the Trump administration reasoned that its policy would return power to localities,
the truth is that localities have been actively impeding fair housing for the majority
of American history. While there are certainly areas in our economy that may benefit
from deregulation, decades of racial injustice caused by the absence of regulations in
the housing industry signal that deregulation in the area of housing should be
approached with extreme caution. As explained above, the residential segregation
we see in American cities today is a result of a century of concerted government
effort. Because of this, government must be actively involved in reversing the
process, and more burdens should be placed on municipalities to affirmatively further
fair housing.

CONCLUSION
In sum, American metropolitan areas remain segregated in the present day due
to decades of racist housing policies that were actively pushed by all levels of
government. This mission of residential segregation started with local governments
enacting zoning ordinances that explicitly preventing white people and people of
color from living or purchasing property on the same block. When the Supreme
Court struck down explicit racial zoning ordinances in the case of Buchanan v.
Warley, local governments began to rely on comprehensive city planning and
economic zoning ordinances to achieve the same result of residential segregation.
The federal government became involved when Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover’s Advisory Committee on Zoning published the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act—a model comprehensive zoning law that was circulated to thousands
of municipalities countrywide. This approach proved to be a success, with numerous
localities enacting enabling statutes based on the model law within a couple years of
its release. Economic zoning measures then went on to receive the blessing of the
nation’s highest court in the case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.—
a decision that many view with high esteem but is actually tainted with racist
undertones.
A century later, effects of government-sponsored segregation are still widespread
in the United States. To counter and reverse the consequences of decades of
government-sponsored segregation, the United States needs a new civil rights
campaign to take affirmative and aggressive action towards integrating our cities.
We must aggressively advocate for housing policy reform. We must require states
and municipalities to adopt inclusionary zoning measures, like those seen in states
like Massachusetts and New Jersey. We must encourage land banking and
coordinated community investment to restore neighborhoods that have become
144. Id. at 1018–19 (2016).
145. Secretary Carson Terminates 2015 AFFH Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URB. DEV. (July 23, 2020),
https://www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/HUD_No_20_109.
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poverty-stricken as a result of many of these exclusionary zoning ordinances. We
must tighten up federal legislation and administrative regulations that follow so that
municipalities will have to take responsibility for their share of fair housing. Lastly,
we must better educate our youth so that our children do not grow up thinking that
the segregated cities that they grow up in are products of natural migration. History
has shown that passively waiting for a gradual change towards integration is not—
and will never be—enough. De jure segregation can only be rectified through de jure
integration, and a great deal remains to be done.

